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An Examination of Law School
Employment Data
Trevor Boeckmann
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the employment prospects for students graduating from
law school. I find that student expectations are unrealistically high and are the result of
deceptive practices by law schools who are attempting to maximize their score in the U.S.
News and World Report ranking system. I examine possible solutions to this problem, and
propose increasing transparency as the best option. This paper highlights the problems and
limitations in using data.
I.  Introduction
Law school:  the solution to all of life’s financial problems; a golden
ticket to a six-digit salary. At least that is how many of 2009’s 43,000
new Juris Doctors (JDs) saw it (Segal 2011).  The truth may not be so
rosy. Law school graduates are going hundreds of thousands of dollars
into debt, and employment is not keeping up with the supply of lawyers.
The University of Texas, known as one of the nation’s top schools, saw
employment drop ten to fifteen percent for its 2010 graduates (Koppel
2010).
Still, law schools continue to attract students. They mass mail glossy
advertisements full of statistics boasting huge wages and 90 percent plus
employment rates (Redefining Opportunity 2011; New York Law School
2011). The stakes are too large to do any different. Twenty-five additional
students at a law school will generate a million dollars for the
administration; twenty-five fewer students matriculating could mean a
drop in ranking, and even fewer students in the future (Segal 2011). There
are strong incentives for law schools to mislead prospective students. 
While many elements of the rankings system can be manipulated,
salary and employment data may be the easiest to distort. The data are
collected by schools, the process has no oversight, and biases may
influence median salaries. My research question is: do law schools
misrepresent employment prospects to prospective students, and, if so,
what can be done to fix the problem? I find that they do, and that
increased transparency is the best solution.
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II.  Background
The American Bar Association (ABA) fully accredits 190 law schools in
the United States. The schools are then ranked by U.S. News & World
Report based on a quality assessment, their selectivity, placement success,
and faculty resources. Until this year, any school not ranked in the top
100 was designated as tier three or four (U.S. News Staff 2008).
Informally, the top 50 schools were known as tier one and the remaining
50 as tier two. In March, U.S. News started ranking the top three-fourths
of schools, designating the bottom quarter as tier two (Morse and
Flanigan 2011). This paper will use the older terminology.
While U.S. News’s system has no official recognition from the
American Bar Association, it holds a de-facto monopoly for law school
rankings. In a recent survey by Kaplan, a Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) prep company, a plurality of respondents said a law school’s
ranking was the most important factor in deciding where to attend,
beating out job prospects and geographic location (Schaffer 2010). Law
school administrators are well aware of this. During an interview with the
New York Times, University of Baltimore School of Law Dean Phillip J.
Closius recounted a conversation he had when applying for the job. “I
said ‘I can talk for ten minutes about the fallacies of the U.S. News
rankings,’ but nobody wants to hear about fallacies. There are millions of
dollars riding on students’ decisions about where to go to law school, and
that creates real institutional pressures” (Segal 2011, 3).
Forty percent of the U.S. News ranking comes from a quality
assessment. Twenty-five percentage points of the quality assessment are
derived from a peer assessment score. The other fifteen percentage points
are from assessments by lawyers and judges (U.S. News Staff 2008). U.S.
News has recently begun to include hiring partners and recruiters in this
score so the ratings more accurately reflect relative employment prospects
(Morse and Flanigan 2011).
The next 25 percent of the U.S. News ranking is based on selectivity.
Twelve and a half percentage points come from median LSAT scores, and
ten percentage points come from the median undergraduate grade point
average (GPA). This is the only part of the ranking based on the
qualifications of the students admitted, so schools place huge emphasis
on it. Some have even manipulated their numbers. At the University of
Baltimore, 40 students with low LSAT scores were shifted to a part-time
program to avoid being included in the rankings (Segal 2011). At
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Villanova, administrators admitted to submitting fraudulent GPA and
LSAT numbers (Elie Mystal, Above the Law, entry posted February 4,
2011). The other two and a half percentage points are based on the
school’s acceptance rate. Schools use a variety of techniques to boost this
score. Some are notorious for yield protecting, a process of rejecting or
waitlisting  students with “too high” numbers for fear they will attend a1
better ranked school. For every accepted student who attends somewhere
else, schools have to admit another student. Other schools wait until late
into a cycle to make a decision on students. They are hoping uninterested
students will withdraw, leaving only those who will attend when admitted
(Top Law Schools 2011). The University of Virginia is famed for its early
decision policy to decrease the acceptance rate. Students applying for
early decision (ED) enter a binding contact to matriculate at the school
that accepts them.  While most schools have an application deadline,
Virginia allows students to turn their application into an early decision
one at any time. For its leniency on GPA and LSAT scores for early
decision applicants, borderline students for the elite schools are
commonly told to ED at Virginia (DeLeon 2009).
Faculty resources make up fifteen percent of the U.S. News ranking.
It includes expenditures per student, student/faculty ratio, and library
resources. Expenditures per student is the factor commonly manipulated.
In 2005, Stanford worked to add utility costs to its total expenditures, and
Illinois calculated a market value of over $8 million for its library
subscription services. When the American Bar Association told Illinois
this wasn’t a fair total, Illinois changed the figure – for everyone but U.S.
News (Wellen 2005).
The final 20 percent of the ranking is from placement success.
Employment rate at graduation makes up four percentage points, and
employment nine months after graduation is fourteen percentage points.
The final two percentage points are based on the ratio of the Bar passage
rate of the graduating class to the Bar passage statewide in the state where
the largest number of graduates took the test. The bulk of this paper will
discuss how the employment rate nine months after graduation is
manipulated.
Law schools are far from covert about using these techniques. “The
U.S. News & World Report survey truly dominates our lives in ways you
couldn't imagine,” said Paul Caron, a law professor at the University of
Cincinnati (Wellen 2005, 1). Other techniques include enrolling students
for one class in the summer to avoid counting them in fall enrollment
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figures and accepting many transfer students with high employment
potential but low LSAT scores or GPAs (Wellen 2005). Because the
rankings only consider scores of the incoming class, transfer students are
not included.
III.  Expectations
Before asking if law schools misrepresent information to students, we will
examine the expectations students have about job prospects when entering
law school. Data are not easy to come by, but some organizations such as
Kaplan have started to examine expectations. Their 2010 survey of 1,383
students taking the October LSAT found 52 percent of them were “very
confident” in finding a job after graduation. This contrasts with the 16
percent who were “very confident” their classmates could find jobs
(Schaffer 2010). The American Bar Association cited unrealistic
expectations of graduates in its 2009 report on the value of attending law
school. “Far too many law students expect that earning a law degree will
solve their financial problems for life. In reality, however, attending law
school can become a financial burden for law students who fail to
consider carefully the financial implications of their decision” (ABA
Commission 2009). Anecdotal accounts by journalists suggest this is true
(Kwoh 2010; Koppel 2010; Segal 2011).
This assessment is backed by the rise of so-called scam bloggers.
These disgruntled law school graduates come from a variety of
backgrounds and schools, but all have one thing in common – they regret
attending law school. They have taken their complaints to internet sites
under a variety of names. Third Tier Reality’s self-proclaimed mission is
to “inform potential law school students and applicants of the ugly
realities of attending law school” (Third Tier Reality 2011). Esq. Never
wants to “expose the law school scam” (Esq. Never 2011). The Jobless
Juris Doctorate exists to “vent about the evils of the legal profession, the
law school scam, and being jobless with a JD” (Jobless Juris Doctorate
2011). The list goes on from there: Shilling Me Softly, Subprime JD, But
I Did Everything Right, First Tier Toilet, Exposing the Law School Scam,
and more sprout up daily.
Law schools aren’t doing much to combat these overhyped
expectations. According to information made available from U.S. News
& World Report and Law School Transparency, a non-profit working to
increase employment information available from law schools, 93.5
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percent of law school students are employed nine months after
graduation. That number is up from 84 percent in 1997 (Segal 2011).
Those employed, on average, make just under $100,000 in the private
sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).
Schools aren’t afraid to tout this information. New York Law School,
currently a member of U.S. News’s lowest ranked tier four category,
boasts a 90 percent employment rate in the packet it sends to prospective
students (New York Law School 2011). Another tier four school, John
Marshall University, does the same in its viewbook (Redefining
Opportunity 2011).
The official employment numbers from large firms seem to contradict
the schools’ claims. Northwestern Law reported in January that 15,000
legal positions in the nation’s largest firms had been eliminated in the past
two years. Only 69 percent of 2010 summer interns were offered a job in
the fall, down from 90 percent the previous year. Sixty percent of the top
200 largest firms deferred start dates for 2009 grads (Center for Career
Strategy & Advancement 2011).
Meanwhile, the supply of legal professionals is increasing. Forty-
three thousand students graduated with a law degree in 2009, compared
to under 40,000 in 1999 (Segal 2011). Five percent of lawyers would need
to retire annually to accommodate the new batch of lawyers, assuming the
employment rates claimed by the schools (see Table 1.2 in the Appendix).
Things don’t appear to be getting better. In 2009-2010, a record-setting
171,514 LSATs were administered, a thirteen percent increase from the
previous year (The Law School Admission Council 2011). 
IV.  Manipulating the Data
The background presents a dichotomy. On one hand, prospective legal
students think highly of their employment prospects, and law schools
claim to be placing an ever-increasing number of students into secure,
well-paying jobs. On the other hand, those secure, well-paying jobs don’t
seem to exist. What’s actually happening? This paper will argue that, just
as with seemingly every other aspect of U.S. News’s ranking system,
schools are manipulating the data.
They are able to do this in many ways. First, employed is a very broad
category. As the New York Times explained it, “Waiting tables at
Applebee’s? You’re employed. Stocking aisles at Home Depot? You’re
working, too” (Segal 2011, 1). Employment doesn’t require a law degree,
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nor does it requiring having a full-time, permanent position. The National
Association for Law Placement reports 88.2 percent of graduates are
employed nine months after graduation. When part-time, non-legal
positions are removed, the number drops to 62.9 percent (Campos 2011).
When temporary positions are excluded, the number drops even further.
A University of Colorado professor was able to gain access to the
employment data of a tier one school where, excluding part-time, non-
legal, and temporary positions, the employment rate dropped to 45
percent (Campos 2011). 
Once employed, the jobs aren’t always what graduates expect.
Temporary document-review jobs are compared to sweatshops by user-
submitted posts on the scam blog Temporary Attorney. Another popular
site, Shit Law Jobs, serves as a clearinghouse for legal grads desperate for
any work. From their About Us page, “Are you a laid-off lawyer or a
recent law school graduate and desperate for a job? Perhaps we can help.
We don't list jobs everyone wants. Instead, we list jobs most lawyers
likely wouldn't want. But, hey, it beats being unemployed” (Shit Law Jobs
2011).
Law schools take advantage of the timing of employment information.
Again, U.S. News rankings are heavily based on employment nine months
after graduation. The magical date for schools is February 15th, the year
after graduation. Anyone who is employed on that day is included in the
employment numbers. Last year, Georgetown Law contacted unemployed
graduates asking them to apply for three newly created temporary
positions in the school’s admissions department. These $20-per-hour, six-
week jobs would last – you guessed it – through the month of February
(Segal 2011).
The National Association for Law Placement reports that 42 percent
of law schools create temporary positions for their unemployed graduates.
At some schools, it accounts for up to 50 jobs (Leipold 2010). The Dean
of Michigan Law Admissions, Sarah Zearfoss, admitted on her blog to
hiring 17 graduates at this top 10 school. She questions whether there’s
a problem with this practice. “There are two common ways of
characterizing that funding: one is that it's a duplicitous, underhanded way
to pump up employment numbers; the other is that it's a supportive
institutional move that helps position grads to find long-term legal
employment during an unusually difficult economic downturn” (Sarah
Zearfoss, A 2 Z, entry posted February 2, 2011). 
This all helps to explain contradictory industry-wide data. The Bureau
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of Labor Statistics reports jobs for lawyers are increasing by two percent
annually, while the number of students graduating with a JD is only
increasing by one percent annually (see Table 1.2 in the Appendix). This
suggests that the legal market is not flooded with lawyers, and is counter
to the other points I have made. I have two explanations, both of which
probably play a part. First, the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not
distinguish between temporary and part-time work. It is possible that there
are jobs for lawyers available, but they are not the stable and well-paying
jobs graduates expect and need to pay off their debt. Second, there is
nothing to suggest the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data are better than any
others I have analyzed. U.S. News collects employment data from law
schools, and the National Association for Law Placement collects data
from law firms. Both appear to not accurately reflect the true employment
prospects for graduates. It is hard to imagine the Bureau of Labor
Statistics can somehow find better data. In fact, they cite the National
Association for Law Placement as a source for additional information
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).
The salary information provided by the schools also hinge on a
number of dubious assumptions. Let’s look at the CUNY School of Law
as an example. To find the median salary of private sector employees, the
school first takes the total number of students in the graduating class.
CUNY  had 132 graduates in the class of 2008. Take that number and
multiply it by the employment rate. CUNY’s 81.7 percent employment
rate leaves it with 108 graduates. Out of this sub-section, only 28.7
percent (or 31 graduates) were working in the private sector. Salary
information always uses private salary information because the public
sector pays considerably less, so most lawyers in the public sector are
presumably choosing it for reasons other than salary. Out of the 31
graduates remaining, only 29 percent (or 9 students) reported their salary
to CUNY. Thus, their median salary of $53,524 is derived from 6.8
percent of the graduating class. Three times as many CUNY graduates are
unemployed (Law School Transparency 2011b). On average, only two in
five students are included in the salary information provided by the
schools (see Table 1.1 in the Appendix).
The employment rate is far from perfect. Prior to 2011, U.S. News
assumed 25 percent of graduates who could not be contacted were
employed (U.S. News Staff 2008). It had also refused to disclose what
percentage of the employment rate this includes. Both of those policies
were changed in 2011 (Morse and Flanigan 2011). Because of this, while
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CUNY appeared to find its median salary from nine students, it’s not
inconceivable that the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile
salaries were based on a sample of three students. 
In better economies with fewer law school graduates, it may be
reasonable to only consider salaries of those in the private sector. In an
economy where ShitLawJobs.com is popular and lawyers are volunteering
their services to boost resumes, to assume that those doing public work
choose to do so is unwarranted (Simmons 2009). Excluding the 30
percent of public sector employees from salary information skews the
results and gives a misleading median income.
The most egregious mistake is to assume respondents for salary
information are representative of the population as a whole. Many studies
have shown dishonest response rates to socially undesirable issues
(Weinhardt, et al. 1998; Zenilman, et al. 1995). I suspect a law school
graduate making $160,000 at one of the nation’s largest firms would be
more likely to submit her salary than a graduate working a minimum wage
job at Applebee’s.
Not only is there a natural reporting bias in salary reporting, but some
schools are embracing the problem. In November, an anonymous law
school alumnus contacted the legal blogosphere with an email he had
received from his New York area school’s career services department. “If
you have secured employment, please complete and return the attached
Graduate Employment Survey,” read the email (Elie Mystal, Above the
Law, entry posted November 17, 2010, emphasis added). While there was
no independent verification of this claim, many commenters shared
similar experiences from their own schools. U.S. News has created a
system where it’s in schools’ best interests to ignore unemployed
graduates. It should come as no surprise when schools respond to those
incentives.
In March of 2011, U.S. News & World Report overhauled the
employment section of its rankings system. Twenty-five percent of
missing graduates are no longer counted as employed, and those not
seeking employment are no longer excluded from the employment rate
(Morse and Flanigan 2011). In addition, U.S. News premium subscribers
can see what percentage of graduates went into bar admission required,
JD preferred, professional, and non-professional positions, and what
percentage of each category is employed full-time. The non-professional
category claims to include temporary positions and any job “not viewed
as part of a career path” (U.S. News & World Report 2011a). This change
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in U.S. News’s methodology has the potential to correct many of the
problems highlighted. Claims of 100 percent employment rates have
disappeared, and the increased information has allowed groups to present
employment prospects to students in new ways.
With each system comes new flaws and opportunities to manipulate
data. Paul Pless, the Dean of Illinois Law School Admissions, expressed
concerns about the decision to include part-time work while excluding
continuing education: 
Why [U.S. News] values working part-time in a non-law field
more highly than pursuing an advanced degree is a question for
them I suppose. At Illinois we feel that these advanced degrees
are incredibly valuable to our graduates and will continue to
encourage students to pursue them when it fits with their long
term career goals (Pless 2011a).
Many students hold teaching assistant positions while completing post-
graduate work. While law schools have had no reason to include those
positions as “employment” in the past, they now will (Pless 2011b).
Undoubtedly, other techniques will emerge to boost employment
numbers, as well.
The lack of permanent, well-paying jobs might be a manageable
problem if the cost of a legal education wasn’t skyrocketing. In 2009, the
median non-resident tuition and fees for a public law school increased by
38 percent over the previous year (American Bar Association 2009); the
average 2009 graduate was $91,506 in debt (Law School Transparency
2011b). For 2010 graduates at California Western School of Law, the
average debt level was $145,621 (U.S. News & World Report 2011b).
Increasing indebtedness disproportionally affects the best and worst
law school. Four of the top ten most indebted schools are in U.S. News’s
bottom tier, and six of the traditional top fourteen schools are in the top
twenty-five for indebtedness (U.S. News & World Report 2011b). At
current growth rates of tuition, Cornell University Law School – a top
fourteen institution – will have an annual tuition of $78,629 by 2020
(Matt Leichter, The Law School Tuition Bubble, entry posted February
1, 2011). Dean David Van Zandt of Northwestern finds that graduates
need to make a starting salary of $65,315 to earn a return on law school.
Over 40 percent do not (ABA Commission 2009). With an ever-
increasing debt load and fragile job prospects, graduates may find it
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difficult to pay the bills.
V.  Literature Review on Self-Reported Data
Kuncel, Crede, and Thomas (2005) find that self-reported GPAs are not
accurate predicators of actual GPAs for high school and college students.
In particular, they find those with low GPAs were more likely to
misreport data than their higher-achieving classmates. This effect held
even when there was no benefit for misrepresenting the information,
much like the salary information from law school graduates.
Weinhardt, et al. (1998) and Zenilman, et al. (1995) examine self-
reported behavior in sexual health. Both conclude the data are unreliable.
Weinhardt mentions the lack of a “gold standard” with which to compare
self-reported data and reality. Zenilman uses the lack of correlation
between unprotected sex and sexually transmitted disease as a standard
(1995, 2). Weinhardt recommends several techniques to elicit more
reliable data.
In contrast, Benitez-Silvia, et al. (2004) looks for unreliable self-
reported data in indicators for disability. They find applicants for
disability are relatively truthful, and are unable to reject the reliability of
the self-reported indicators.
Burger and Owens (2010) look to non-governmental organizations’
(NGO) finances to examine self-reported data. They find that NGOs
inaccurately report, and are unwilling to provide, information. The
accuracy of the information is correlated with the amount of third-party
oversight. 
VI.  Alternative Systems
Part of the problem lies in the perverse system of incentives created by
the U.S. News rankings. Whichever school is the first to bring
transparency to employment prospects for graduates is the school that will
plummet in the rankings. There is too much on the line to go it alone.
In July, Law School Transparency contacted every American Bar
Association accredited school to ask for expanded employment data,
beginning with the class of 2010. Out of the 199 schools contacted, only
eleven responded by November. Out of the eleven, only Ave Maria
agreed to participate in the project (McEntee, Lynch and Reyes 2010).
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Ashby Jones of the Wall Street Journal Law Blog called Ave Maria’s
decision “a lone beacon of light [that] has emerged from the darkness”
(entry posted September 17, 2010). By February, Ave Maria had backed
out of its involvement (Law School Transparency 2011a).
How, then, can the problem be fixed? A number of solutions have
been proposed, from tweaking the current system to a complete overhaul.
The reform with the most momentum, in light of Law School
Transparency’s unsuccessful attempt at voluntary disclosure, is
mandating additional employment information. In October, American Bar
Association President Steve Zack announced a new examination of
employment data, known as the “Truth in Law School Education” project.
Other American Bar Association committees have initiated similar efforts
(Sloan 2010). The American Bar Association’s Young Lawyers Division
adopted a six-part resolution on this issue in October. The following
issues were addressed: delineating full-time, part-time, and temporary
positions; providing salary information for various fields instead of
including them all in one; and providing greater transparency in tuition
costs. The committee of nearly 300 members passed the resolution
unanimously (Sloan 2011).
Law School Transparency would like to see the American Bar
Association’s efforts taken even further.  Its “White Paper,” the founding
document for the organization, calls on each school to provide the
following information:
Job List




4. Bar Passage Required, Preferred, or Neither
5. Full-Time / Part-Time
6. Office Location (City, State, Country)
7. Salary Source
8. Was the student on a primary law journal, secondary law journal, or
no law journal?
11
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Salary List
1. Employer Type
2. Office Location (City, State, Country)
3. Full-Time / Part-Time
4. Salary (McEntee and Lynch 2010)
While the intentions are commendable, many schools cited privacy
concerns as justification for not providing the information (McEntee,
Lynch and Reyes 2010). The American Bar Association doesn’t appear
to be considering any proposal this expansive.
Legal academia has seen a push towards great transparency as well.
Morriss and Henderson (2008) critique the current system, and then
propose including more information in the rankings. In particular, they
want the number of firms interviewing on campus, the success of those
interviewed, salaries by profession, and a standardized bar passage system
to be available to prospective students.
A colleague of Henderson’s, Jeffrey Stakes, published a critique of
U.S. News’ ranking system in 2006. He calls for measures of student
involvement, quality of teaching, and educational opportunities provided
to be included in the rankings. Additionally, he calls for a number of
changes to current measures because of the perverse incentive system
they create for schools. For instance, he claims changing the LSAT
measure from median or a mix of 25th and 75th percentiles to only 75th
percentile would allow schools to have more leeway in selecting better
intangibles in applicants (Stakes 2006).
Other critics of U.S. News have made more drastic proposals. Perry
(2007) tosses out the ranking system in favor of ordering by law journal
citations. This mirrors how academics informally rate themselves, and his
final rankings mostly reflected traditional orders of law school prestige.
While these authors berated U.S. News for the manipulability of the
current system, none considered how their systems would be manipulated.
Stakes claims measuring LSAT by the 75th percentile will allow schools
to admit more honest students with interesting life stories. Some altruistic
schools would, admittedly, probably do this. Rating-savvy schools would
give all of their scholarship money to the one-fourth of the class with the
LSAT score they want. We’ll call these students the Gunners . The other2
three-fourths of admittances would go to students with very high GPAs
and very low LSAT scores. These students, the Reverse Splitters , will be3
12
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ignored by other top-tiered schools. The Gunners will have a larger
scholarship at Savvy School than from any peer school, and the Reverse
Splitters will not be accepted at any of Savvy’s peer institutions. Both
will flock to attend. Savvy’s 75th percentile LSAT score and median GPA
will skyrocket as the acceptance rate plummets. With their new statistics,
Savvy will fly up the rankings, bypassing Altruistic Law School. As
Altruist’s ranking falls, so will the quality of its applicants. Its Dean will
be fired and blamed for its fall from greatness. Soon, law reviews will be
full of law professors decrying the power of the rankings. It’s too easy to
manipulate, they will claim. Something needs to change, they will say.
Even Perry’s system, while much more difficult to manipulate, is not
without its faults. If only law review citations are included, his ranking
system creates an incentive to put more and more money into the law
review, and less and less into faculty and practical experiences. Law
school is vocational; unemployed and underemployed graduates are not
helped by a top-ranked legal journal. If the system mirrored other
academic rankings and included faculty citations from any journal, the
quality of the law review could plummet. Time and funding would be
spent publishing in prestigious journals instead of in the law review.
Critics of U.S. News attack the arbitrary nature of the rankings.
Indiana Law School even hosts The Law School Ranking Game on its
website. Players choose any components of the U.S. News rankings,
assign their own weightings, and see the results. The site compares the
current system to dating and asks if you would allow U.S. News to pick
a significant other for you (Orentstein 2005). These criticisms ignore the
self-organizing nature of the rankings. This paper has established that
students care about the rankings a lot – probably irrationally so; it’s the
number one thing they look for in a law school (Schaffer 2010). The top-
ranked students and top-ranked faculty will go to the top-ranked law
schools. By calling Yale the best law school in the country, it will become
the top ranked law school. Perry (2007) found that Yale’s law journal had
the greatest impact of any school’s flagship journal. It’s not as if U.S.
News found the perfect formula. They just found a way to herd the best
students to Yale, thereby giving it the best journal. Any change designed
to add uncertainty to the ranking system, such as randomly changing
weightings each year, undermines this feature. The result isn’t a perfect,
nor a fair system – but the alternatives are not any better. 
The best solution to an imperfect system seems to be increased
transparency. It is hard to envision any system immune to manipulation.
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While there may be a temporary benefit while schools attempt to
understand the intricacies of a new system and seek to develop new
techniques, it probably won’t last. Relying on transparency over changing
rankings puts the burden back on students to make a decision about their
futures in an informed fashion.
There also needs to be a culture shift regarding law school. Students’
advisors need to be informed about the realities of law school. Far too
many professors have supported students who decide to attend tier three
or four institutions while racking up hundreds of thousands of dollars of
debt that few will be able to pay off. Making both students and advisors
better informed should produce better outcomes.
VII.  Limitations
As can be expected in a paper highlighting the lack of available data, data
were hard to come by for my research. The evidence of poor employment
prospects came mainly from blogs and journalist reports. Both suffer from
a small sample size and a self-selection bias. Stories about happy, content,
and employed lawyers don’t see print. 
The premise of this paper is that law schools are reporting high
employment rates and good jobs, but it doesn’t match the evidence. More
law degrees are given almost every year, large firms are cutting positions,
and there are reports of lawyers from good schools who are struggling to
find jobs. Much of this evidence is circumstantial. It’s possible that more
graduates are deciding that the legal world isn’t for them, and pursuing
other fields. This would account for the seeming contradiction in an
increase of JDs, increasing employment rates, and a decrease in good
legal jobs. It’s possible that more graduates are choosing to enter public
interest fields. This paper criticized reported salaries for being
unrepresentative of a graduating class, but if those salaries are available
for anyone who wants to pursue them and the lower salaries are self-
selected, it ceases to be a problem. It’s possible official statements from
the American Bar Association warning of debt and worse than expected
job prospects are damage control. I assume they have access to more
reliable and detailed data than the general public, which provoked its
paper. Another reasonable explanation is that they saw the outpouring of
negative press reports, and decided to respond with a vague, general
warning. I believe I am justified in making the assumptions I have for two
reasons. First, this is an issue with enormous implications. Students are
14
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investing $100,000 and more to attend law school. While they may never
be fully informed about the returns to expect, they deserve to have as
much information as can be provided. Second, data on this topic may
never reach the point where it is accurate enough for a paper that isn’t full
of caveats. Schools will not give overly detailed information on graduates
because of privacy concerns, and those data would still not show who
chose public and non-legal jobs, and who was forced into them.
U.S. News’s decision to overhaul employment information in March
is a severe limitation of this paper. The effects of this change can’t be
overstated: it has the potential to drastically alter students’ expectations.
Currently, it’s raw data that needs to be organized and systemized for
potential students. I expect Law School Transparency to lead this effort
in the near future, but time restrictions will prevent me from reviewing
anything new. Any recommendations I make for a solution may quickly
be outdated.
While the realities of law school data require this paper to be heavily
nuanced, at the very least it provides an alternative to the law schools’
portrayal of employment prospects. Readers should be skeptical about all
claims of employment prospects, this paper’s included. 
VIII.  Economic Theory
Neoclassical economics is based on three assumptions: “1. People have
rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and
firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full
and relevant information” (Weintraub 2002). A problem arises when
people make decisions without access to full and relevant information.
In the banking industry, unreliable data are associated with fewer
loans and a higher default rate (Islam 2007). Transparent, reliable
governmental data are correlated with increased prosperity (Islam 2003).
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) find asymmetric information in insurance
markets can undermine market equilibrium.
Law schools have seen similar consequences. Students, often unaware
of employment prospects, are left with no way to pay back their loans.
Economic theory would predict that, when there are more lawyers than
permanent jobs, wages will decrease and proportionally fewer lawyers
will find employment. We see that happening already. With decreased
expected future income, fewer people should enter the legal field,
bringing employment to a new equilibrium. This has not happened. The
15
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lack of reliable, accurate employment and salary data could be partly to
blame.
IX.  Conclusion
This paper sought to find whether law schools misrepresent employment
data to prospective students. I find that they do. I also sought to provide
an alternative to the current system. U.S. News’s rankings have received
criticism, but no relevant and unmanipulatable system has been
articulated. I find benefits associated with the current rankings, and call
for an increase in the amount and kinds of employment information
available to prospective students.
An overview of the U.S. News ranking system shows schools pursue
strategies to maximize their score. Many of these strategies undermine the
intent of the categories; others are outright fraudulent. Law school deans
and professors often admit to the importance placed internally on
increasing their rank.
One section of the rankings includes proxies for employment
prospects. I find apparent contradictions between statistics cited by
schools and those compiled by large firms. Further evidence for this
disparity is the increase in unemployed and underemployed lawyers in
media and on scam blogs. Much of this can be explained by the deceptive
practices used by schools to boost employment rates. Beyond employment
itself, salary information appears to be misleading. It suffers from a self-
selection bias and from techniques used by the schools to distort data.
There is an extensive literature on the problems inherent with self-
reported data, particularly when the answer is socially undesirable.
The two strategies proposed to fix this problem are reforming the U.S.
News ranking system and increasing available information, but not
necessarily incorporating it into the rankings. I argue the latter is the
better option. Rankings can, and will, always be manipulated. Increasing
information provides the best opportunity for students to become
informed on their own.
This paper is heavily nuanced and relies on many assumptions,
though all seem reasonable. Research attempting to provide data about the
lack of data will necessarily be so. Regardless of the results of this paper,
I hope it can give us humility when looking at data.
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5 U Chicago 99.0% 84.5% 99.0% 82.8%
4 Columbia U (NY) 99.5% 83.0% 98.0% 80.9%
48 Southern Methodist U 98.6% 89.0% 89.0% 78.1%
11 Duke U (NC) 100.0% 78.0% 96.0% 74.9%
86 U of Arkansas-Fayetteville 95.7% 79.0% 98.0% 74.1%
6 New York U 99.2% 77.3% 96.0% 73.6%
34 Fordham U (NY) 95.1% 85.6% 89.0% 72.5%
7 UC Berkeley (Boalt) 98.6% 76.0% 94.0% 70.4%
2 Harvard U (MA) 99.3% 70.3% 100.0% 69.8%
10 U Virginia 99.5% 77.9% 89.0% 69.0%
14 Georgetown U (DC) 97.0% 78.6% 90.0% 68.6%
13 Cornell U (NY) 98.4% 85.0% 82.0% 68.6%
9 U Michigan-Ann Arbor 99.8% 77.7% 88.0% 68.2%
18 U Southern California 97.1% 82.5% 82.0% 65.7%
7 U Pennsylvania 99.6% 80.7% 81.0% 65.1%
22 Emory U (GA) 95.3% 80.6% 83.0% 63.8%
20 George Washington U 98.9% 73.0% 87.0% 62.8%
142 University of Akron (OH) 87.6% 71.0% 100.0% 62.2%
72 U Oklahoma 95.6% 72.0% 89.0% 61.3%
28 Boston College 97.4% 72.0% 87.0% 61.0%
22 Boston U 99.1% 74.0% 82.0% 60.1%
60 U Houston 97.2% 79.0% 78.0% 59.9%
80 Louisiana State U 96.1% 62.0% 100.0% 59.6%
52 Yeshiva U (Cardozo) 94.3% 77.0% 82.0% 59.5%
142 Wayne State U (MI) 87.5% 79.1% 86.0% 59.5%
188 Univ of Tulsa (OK) 92.3% 79.7% 80.0% 58.9%
21 U Illinois (UIUC) 96.8% 73.9% 82.0% 58.7%
11 Northwestern U (IL) 100.0% 79.0% 74.0% 58.5%
188 Texas Wesleyan University 76.0% 87.0% 87.0% 57.5%
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15 U Texas-Austin 98.1% 73.0% 80.0% 57.3%
105 St. Louis U 92.9% 79.0% 78.0% 57.2%
17 Vanderbilt U (TN) 98.4% 77.0% 74.0% 56.1%
38 Wake Forest U (NC) 95.8% 76.0% 76.0% 55.3%
105 Marquette U (WI) 92.8% 78.0% 76.0% 55.0%
60 Georgia State U 98.6% 75.0% 74.0% 54.7%
188 Oklahoma City Univ 92.1% 76.7% 77.0% 54.4%
98 William Mitchell College
of Law (MN)
96.8% 78.0% 72.0% 54.4%
142 Texas Tech Univ 87.8% 71.8% 85.0% 53.6%
142 Franklin Pierce Law Center
(NY)
94.1% 75.4% 75.0% 53.2%
188 Univ. Of Dayton (OH) 92.1% 71.0% 81.0% 53.0%
98 DePaul U (IL) 94.0% 75.1% 75.0% 52.9%
28 William & Mary (VA) 96.7% 67.0% 81.0% 52.5%
142 Mercer Univ (George)
(GA)
92.1% 71.0% 80.0% 52.3%
47 U Florida 96.6% 73.2% 73.0% 51.6%
34 Washington & Lee U 89.2% 64.0% 89.0% 50.8%
15 UCLA 99.1% 70.6% 71.0% 49.7%
56 U San Diego 98.4% 74.0% 68.0% 49.5%
67 Villanova U (PA) 94.2% 73.0% 72.0% 49.5%
188 Northern Kentucky Univ
(Chase)
92.5% 73.1% 73.0% 49.4%
142 Stetson University (FL) 95.1% 72.0% 72.0% 49.3%
188 Mississippi College 94.4% 72.0% 72.0% 48.9%
64 Baylor U (TX) 94.6% 74.0% 69.0% 48.3%
42 UC (Hastings) 92.7% 71.5% 72.0% 47.7%
42 U Utah 100.0% 67.0% 71.0% 47.6%
86 Syracuse University 95.4% 70.0% 71.0% 47.4%
188 Campbell U (Wiggins)
(NC)
93.8% 72.0% 70.0% 47.3%
67 U Pittsburgh 94.2% 78.2% 64.0% 47.1%
67 U Kansas 93.6% 70.8% 71.0% 47.1%
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188 Duquesne U (PA) 85.2% 74.0% 74.0% 46.7%
28 U North Carolina 94.7% 72.0% 67.0% 45.7%
142 Samford U (Cumberland)
(AL)
93.7% 84.0% 58.0% 45.7%
38 U Alabama 96.9% 67.0% 70.0% 45.4%
34 Ohio State U 98.2% 68.0% 68.0% 45.4%
93 Santa Clara U (CA) 92.6% 83.0% 59.0% 45.3%
188 Northern IL U 89.1% 71.0% 71.0% 44.9%
19 Washington U (MO) 95.0% 72.0% 65.0% 44.5%
22 U Notre Dame (IN) 98.7% 66.1% 68.0% 44.4%
56 Loyola (Los Angeles) 97.4% 77.0% 59.0% 44.2%
72 St. John’s U (NY) 95.8% 73.0% 63.0% 44.1%
78 U Nevada-Las Vegas 97.8% 67.2% 67.0% 44.0%
48 Tulane U (LA) 91.1% 67.0% 72.0% 43.9%
64 U Kentucky 98.1% 64.8% 69.0% 43.9%
54 U Connecticut 94.2% 72.2% 64.0% 43.5%
26 Univ of Iowa 100.0% 66.0% 65.0% 42.9%
80 Rutgers-Newark (NJ) 95.6% 62.0% 71.0% 42.1%
142 U of Missouri-KC 95.6% 66.2% 66.0% 41.8%
142 U of Arkansas-Little Rock 95.8% 65.8% 66.0% 41.6%
28 U Georgia 98.4% 65.0% 65.0% 41.6%
1 Yale U (CT) 98.1% 48.7% 87.0% 41.6%
56 Case Western Reserve 95.2% 64.0% 68.0% 41.4%
188 Nova Southeastern U (FL) 85.5% 78.0% 62.0% 41.3%
52 Pepperdine U (CA) 96.5% 83.3% 51.0% 41.0%
188 Suffolk Univ (MA) 89.7% 68.0% 67.0% 40.9%
188 St. Mary’s U (TX) 91.3% 73.0% 61.0% 40.7%
142 Williamette U (Collins)
(OR)
91.1% 68.5% 65.0% 40.6%
48 American U (DC) 95.5% 59.5% 71.0% 40.3%
67 Brooklyn Law School 92.3% 69.1% 63.0% 40.2%
64 Lewis and Clark (OR) 94.3% 65.0% 65.0% 39.8%
3 Stanford U (CA) 98.4% 66.0% 61.0% 39.6%
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142 U of Montana 92.3% 50.0% 85.0% 39.2%
22 U Minnesota-Twin Cities 96.5% 67.7% 60.0% 39.2%
105 U Louisville (KY) 95.1% 73.0% 56.0% 38.9%
188 Whittier Law School (CA) 96.4% 84.0% 48.0% 38.9%
142 Quinnipiac U (CT) 96.4% 55.0% 73.0% 38.7%
93 West Virginia U 98.1% 68.0% 58.0% 38.7%
67 U New Mexico 96.2% 49.0% 82.0% 38.7%
142 Creighton U (NE) 92.4% 69.3% 60.0% 38.4%
98 Univ of the Pacific 95.5% 59.0% 68.0% 38.3%
42 Brigham Young U (UT) 99.0% 69.0% 56.0% 38.3%
188 Barry U (FL) 70.7% 74.0% 73.0% 38.2%
38 U Colorado-Boulder 96.0% 49.0% 81.0% 38.1%
80 U Denver (Sturm) 94.2% 69.0% 58.0% 37.7%
188 Roger Williams U (RI) 88.0% 65.0% 65.0% 37.2%
28 U Wisconsin-Madison 98.3% 70.0% 54.0% 37.2%
78 Loyola U Chicago 93.7% 79.0% 50.0% 37.0%
27 Indiana U-Bloomington 96.2% 62.0% 62.0% 37.0%
34 U Washington 98.2% 61.0% 61.0% 36.5%
60 U Tennessee-Knoxville 95.1% 65.0% 59.0% 36.5%
105 Univ of Maine 91.9% 66.0% 58.0% 35.2%
188 Pace Univ (NY) 91.5% 61.8% 62.0% 35.1%
38 Arizona State U 99.7% 63.0% 55.0% 34.5%
72 U Hawaii 100.0% 46.0% 75.0% 34.5%
93 Chapman U (CA) 96.5% 66.1% 54.0% 34.4%
142 Univ of Mississippi 89.6% 61.0% 63.0% 34.4%
142 Albany Law School (NY) 93.9% 66.6% 55.0% 34.4%
142 Univ of Toledo (OH) 96.3% 56.0% 63.0% 34.0%
86 Northeastern U (MA) 94.1% 60.0% 60.0% 33.9%
105 U South Carolina 91.2% 60.7% 61.0% 33.8%
72 Temple U (PA) 91.4% 60.4% 60.0% 33.1%
42 George Mason U (VA) 99.2% 57.0% 57.0% 32.2%
142 U of Memphis
(Humphreys)
93.3% 80.3% 42.0% 31.5%
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188 Southern IL U-Carbondale 84.9% 60.5% 61.0% 31.3%
56 U Cincinnati 95.8% 63.0% 51.0% 30.8%
142 Howard U (DC) 85.5% 60.0% 60.0% 30.8%
28 UC Davis 98.1% 60.0% 52.0% 30.6%
98 U of San Francisco 93.0% 73.0% 45.0% 30.6%
42 U Arizona (Rogers) 97.3% 57.0% 55.0% 30.5%
105 U at Buffalo-SUNY 91.2% 72.2% 46.0% 30.3%
142 Cleveland State U. 91.1% 77.0% 43.0% 30.2%
86 Indiana U-Indianapolis 96.1% 72.0% 43.0% 29.8%
93 U Nebraska-Lincoln 93.8% 56.2% 56.0% 29.5%
142 U of Nebraska-Lincoln 93.8% 56.2% 56.0% 29.5%
188 John Marshall Law School
(IL)
89.0% 78.0% 42.0% 29.2%
142 Univ of Wyoming 88.9% 56.9% 57.0% 28.8%
188 Texas Southern U
(Marshall)
83.3% 81.0% 42.0% 28.3%
98 Catholic U (DC) 91.9% 55.1% 55.0% 27.9%
142 U of St. Thomas (MN) 90.9% 65.0% 47.0% 27.8%
188 Regent U (VA) 94.4% 54.3% 54.0% 27.7%
142 Vermont Law School 95.2% 53.5% 54.0% 27.5%
188 Hamline U (MN) 90.3% 67.2% 45.0% 27.3%
54 Florida State U 97.6% 58.0% 48.0% 27.2%
48 U Maryland 94.6% 55.0% 52.0% 27.1%
80 U Oregon 90.4% 55.9% 53.0% 26.8%
72 Seton Hall U (NJ) 96.7% 52.4% 52.0% 26.3%
188 South Texas College of
Law
85.1% 79.2% 38.0% 25.6%
93 U Missouri-Columbia 89.6% 65.0% 42.0% 24.5%
86 Seattle U 96.6% 75.0% 32.0% 23.2%
188 Washburn U (KS) 93.5% 56.0% 44.0% 23.0%
72 Pennsylvania State U 90.8% 50.0% 50.0% 22.7%
80 Rutgers-Camden (NJ) 90.0% 50.0% 50.0% 22.5%
188 California Western School
of Law
84.0% 73.0% 36.0% 22.1%
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60 U Miami (FL) 96.4% 76.2% 30.0% 22.0%
142 Southwestern Law School
(CA)
95.5% 79.0% 29.0% 21.9%
188 Capital University (OH) 76.5% 73.2% 39.0% 21.8%
188 U of Baltimore 96.3% 49.0% 45.0% 21.2%
188 U of Detroit Mercy 78.4% 79.0% 34.0% 21.1%
188 Thomas Jefferson School of
Law (CA)
92.1% 69.0% 33.0% 21.0%
86 Hofstra University 96.3% 74.0% 29.0% 20.7%
188 Golden Gate U (CA) 90.3% 63.8% 35.0% 20.2%
142 U of South Dakota 94.3% 46.0% 46.0% 20.0%
142 U of Idaho 87.8% 42.9% 50.0% 18.8%
142 Drake U (IA) 96.8% 71.0% 27.0% 18.6%
188 Widener U (DE) 83.8% 61.8% 35.0% 18.1%
105 Gonzaga U 93.9% 64.0% 30.0% 18.0%
188 Western New England
College (MA)
81.3% 65.0% 33.0% 17.4%
188 Florida Coastal School of
Law
95.4% 62.0% 28.0% 16.6%
142 New York Law School 92.6% 66.0% 27.0% 16.5%
142 U of North Dakota 90.1% 61.0% 30.0% 16.5%
142 Michigan State Univ 91.5% 71.0% 24.0% 15.6%
86 U Richmond (VA) 90.7% 61.0% 28.0% 15.5%
188 Ave Maria School of Law
(MI)
81.5% 65.4% 29.0% 15.5%
142 Ohio Northern Univ (Pettit) 93.4% 55.0% 22.0% 11.3%
188 New England School of
Law (MA)
81.2% 65.7% 16.0% 8.5%
188 Touro College (Fuchsberg)
(NY)
72.3% 72.0% 15.0% 7.8%
188 CUNY–Queens College 81.7% 28.7% 29.0% 6.8%
Source: Law School Transparency (2011b)
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1999 39455 90.3% 464250 36048
2000 39071 91.5% 489530 25280 5.16% 36704 11424 2.33%
2001 38157 90.0% 490000 470 0.10% 35510 35040 7.15%
2002 37909 89.0% 504370 14370 2.85% 34773 20403 4.05%
2003 38605 88.9% 516220 11850 2.30% 33922 22072 4.28%
2004 38874 88.9% 521130 4910 0.94% 33701 28791 5.52%
2005 40023 89.6% 529190 8060 1.52% 34590 26530 5.01%
2006 42673 90.7% 547710 18520 3.38% 35259 16739 3.06%
2007 43920 91.9% 555770 8060 1.45% 36781 28721 5.17%
2008 43518 89.9% 553690 -2080 -0.38% 38363 40443 7.30%
2009 43588 88.3% 38781
2010 44004
AVG 40702 89.9% 517186 9937 1.93% 35857 25574 4.87%
Source: The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010), National Association for Law Placement (2010), The
American Bar Association (2011)
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